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Major League Baseball Commis-
sioner Bud Selig announced he would
crack down on steroid use in baseball,
hoping to stop players from doping.
He was forced to discipline stars like
Rafael Palmeiro, possibly hurting the
game immediately, in order to
develop a reputation for being tough
on steroids. The Federal Reserve 
System has worked hard over the past
few decades not only to lower infla-
tion and keep it low, but also to con-
vince the public that it is dedicated to
delivering low inflation over the long
haul. This Commentary explains why
credibility is so important to mone-
tary policymakers.
Nobel prize winners Edward Prescott
and Finn Kydland introduced the idea of
a “time inconsistency problem” into the
macroeconomics lexicon to represent
the fact that policymakers sometimes
have an incentive to say one thing, but
later do something else. One solution to
the time inconsistency problem is for
policymakers to develop a reputation for
credibility recognizing that the long-
term benefits of having reputation
exceed the short-run costs.
To understand why a monetary policy-
maker would be concerned about credi-
bility, think back to a time when the
Federal Reserve arguably had damaged
its credibility. At the close of the 1970s,
inflation ran in the double digits. The
public may well have concluded that the
central bank was either unwilling or
unable to maintain low, stable inflation
rates. Against this backdrop, in the early
1980s the Federal Reserve ran tight
monetary policy. While it successfully
brought inflation down to around 3 per-
cent, the gain was associated with two
recessions. But, in the process, monetary
policymakers regained their reputation
for delivering low inflation. 
Although many people credit Alan
Greenspan with ushering in a new era 
of low inflation, they do not realize the
extent of his contributions. Before he
took office, much of the initial work of
taming inflation had been initiated, but
during his tenure the Federal Reserve
reduced inflation further and maintained
it, built credibility, and successfully
managed inflation expectations.
Greenspan has described his contribu-
tion as recognizing changes in the U.S.
economy and the ways in which these
changes could be best used to maintain
low inflation. Others have pointed to the
role of clear communication and the
greater transparency of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC)—the 
policymaking arm of the Federal
Reserve—in conditioning expectations
regarding future policy actions. Current
policymakers often emphasize the
importance of credibility and cite the key
role it has played over the past 25 years
in keeping the economy on a steady and
expanding course. 
Why should credibility matter so much?
After all, credibility concerns people’s
beliefs about what policymakers will do
in the future, not their appraisal of what
policymakers have delivered so far. And
thinking back on our battle with inflation
in the 1980s, we might wonder whether
the Federal Reserve’s credibility (or lack
of it) was involved in the length of time
it took to tame inflation or what it cost
the U.S. economy. 
To answer these questions constructively
requires that we think systematically
about the factors involved. Notions like
“credibility”—which, like most abstract
concepts, is somewhat nebulous—must
be defined precisely. In this Economic
Commentary we will construct a simple
model so we can study these questions
systematically, and we will use it to gain
some insight into the importance of
credibility to monetary policy. 
■ Key Elements of a Model 
of Credibility 
In general, central bankers care about
inflation and unemployment. The objec-
tives set for the FOMC by Congress, for
example, are to promote “the goals of
maximum employment, stable prices,
and moderate long-term interest rates.”
But one of the fundamental problems of
central banking is that, in the short term,
there is a trade-off between (unantici-
pated) inflation and unemployment:
Temporarily lower unemployment can be
gained at the cost of permanently higher
inflation. What to do about this trade-off
is only one of the many things that cen-
tral bankers might have a difference of
opinion about, and one of the things that
can lead to different monetary policies
and different economic outcomes.
Over time, the Federal Reserve System
has delivered quite different inflation
rates, and the variation of rates across
countries is even more pronounced.
While it may be possible that the differ-
ences in long-run inflation performance
are the result of good or bad luck,  it is
also possible that they result from the
decisions central bankers and their 
governments have made. They might
have placed more importance on infla-
tion relative to unemployment, or their
underlying inflation targets might have
changed, or they may have differed with
respect to the weight they placed on 
current outcomes relative to future ones.
But the details of central bank prefer-
ences are not important for our current
purposes; what is important is that 
central banks tend to deliver differentinflation rates over time. For clarity of
presentation, suppose that central banks
come in one of two types: ones that
deliver low (2 percent) inflation in the
long term; and ones that deliver high
inflation (10 percent) in the long term.
These types are not immutable. From
time to time, a central bank that typically
delivers low inflation may become one
that typically delivers high inflation, or
vice versa. In the model considered here,
the public knows that such changes can
occur and further knows the probabilities
of such transformations. Since changes
in central-bank type are presumably rare
events, the probability of a transition in
the model is low. 
Central banks have imperfect control
over inflation, especially in the short
term. This imperfect control results
from a variety of factors, like the long
and variable lags between the use of a
monetary policy instrument and its
effect on the inflation rate, and the pres-
ence of other factors that affect infla-
tion, such as energy price shocks. If the
central bank’s type (high or low infla-
tion) is unobservable by the public, then
announcements by a central bank of its
type are inherently not credible and will
be viewed by the public with skepti-
cism. In the model, both types of central
bank would like the public to believe
that it intends to deliver low inflation.
We can imagine a number of reasons
policymakers at a high-inflation central
bank might in reality want the public to
think the central bank is a low-inflation
type; for example, they might want to
exploit the inflation-unemployment
trade-off to their advantage, surprising
the public with higher-than-expected
inflation in order to temporarily lower
the unemployment rate, and so on. 
Since the central bank cannot perfectly
control inflation, observing the current
inflation rate provides the public with a
noisy signal of the central bank’s long-
run inflation intentions. Today’s infla-
tion may be high because the central
bank intends it to be high or because
chance factors have pushed up the
inflation rate under a low-inflation cen-
tral bank. The upshot is that the public
needs to make some sort of guess with
regards to the central bank’s type, and it
needs some means to revise this guess
as new inflation rates are observed. 
■ Bayes’s Rule 
The public’s problem in the model is to
assign a probability (today) to the cen-
tral bank of its being a low-inflation
type. (Since there are only two types of
central bank, the remaining probability
is necessarily assigned to it being a
high-inflation type.) For the moment,
take as given the probability that the
public assigned to the central bank in
the previous period (last month, quarter,
year, whatever) of its being a low-infla-
tion bank. When the public observes a
new inflation rate, how should it update
this probability? It turns out that the
optimal way to do so can be expressed
by a rule known as Bayes’s rule—
Bayes’s rule is a mathematical 
description of how beliefs are best
modified when new information is
acquired. In the current context,
Bayes’s rule would say that the public
ought to take the likelihood that a low-
inflation central bank produced the
current inflation and divide it by the
sum of that likelihood and the likeli-
hood that a high-inflation central bank
produced the current inflation. The
result gives the probability that the
central bank is of the low-inflation
type today.
To apply Bayes’s rule, the public must
be aware of several things: first, the
possibility that the central bank may
have changed its type; second, the
prior probability that the central bank
was a low-inflation bank; third, infla-
tion dynamics. This last item means
that the public knows how inflation
will behave over time under either
type of central bank, with alternative
long-run inflation targets, given his-
tory and various macroeconomic
developments unrelated to monetary
policy. What ends up mattering is the
deviation of actual inflation from what
was expected (the “surprise”) under
different central bank inflation targets. 
The analysis so far suggests the follow-
ing definition: A central bank has credi-
bility (as being tough on inflation)
when the public assigns a high proba-
bility (certainly over 50 percent) that
the central bank is a low-inflation type.
A central bank is, then, losing credibil-
ity when this probability is falling. 
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
*Inflation expectations are derived from the spread between the yields on 
10-year Treasury notes and 10-year Treasury inflation-protected securities.
SOURCE: Bloomberg Financial Services.How will inflation expectations evolve
over time? To start, the expected infla-
tion rate will be a weighted average of
the inflation rate delivered by a high-
inflation Fed (around 10 percent) and
that delivered by a low-inflation Fed
(less than 10 percent), where the
weights are given by the probabilities
that the public assigns to the Fed’s being
a high or low-inflation type. As a result,
just after the Fed changed its type, infla-
tion expectations would remain around
10 percent since the probability associ-
ated with the Fed being a high-inflation
type was close to one while the proba-
bility that it was a low-inflation type
was close to zero. In fact, inflation
expectations will remain above actual
inflation for some time since it takes
time for the public to revise upwards the
probability that the Fed has switched
types. As the Fed continues to deliver
relatively low inflation, the probability
assigned to it being a low-inflation type
will gradually rise, and so inflation
expectations will fall. 
As mentioned earlier, this process of
gaining credibility—raising the proba-
bility that the central bank is a low-
inflation type—is costly since the cen-
tral bank needs to run tight monetary
policy in order to lower the inflation
rate. If the central bank does not “sur-
prise” the public with lower-than-
expected inflation, then the probability
assigned to it being a low-inflation cen-
tral bank will not change, and it does
not gain credibility.
Contrast this situation with one in which
the type of the central bank could be
known by the public. In such a case,
credibility would not be an issue, there
would be no signal extraction problem,
and Bayes’s rule would not need to be
applied. The public could assign a proba-
bility of either zero or one to the central
bank being a low-inflation type. If the
central bank changed from a high-infla-
tion to a low-inflation type, the public
would instantaneously change the proba-
bility that it assigned to the central bank
being a low-inflation type from zero to
one. Inflation expectations would drop
immediately.  The process of gaining
credibility would be incredibly short, and
the central bank would not need to run
tighter-than-expected monetary policy. 
■ A Practical Benefit of 
Credibility 
Flash forward to the time just prior to
the 2001 recession. Having seen many
years of low inflation, the public
assigned a very high probability to the
Federal Reserve being a low-inflation
type of central bank. This credibility
allowed the FOMC to initiate an easier
monetary policy in 2001 and maintain
a fairly accommodative policy for sev-
eral years thereafter without a run-up in
inflation expectations. At the time,
loose monetary policy was entirely
consistent with the Federal Reserve
still being a low-inflation central bank.
Of course, it was possible that the Fed
had switched and was again a high-
inflation central bank. But now the
same mechanism that made it difficult
for the Fed to gain credibility in the
1980s implies that it would take time
for the Fed to lose its credibility after
2001. Owing to Bayes’s rule, the public
continued to assign a probability close
to one that the Fed was a low-inflation
bank, and the Fed maintained its credi-
bility. 
Consider what might have happened if
the FOMC had had less credibility (if
the public had placed a lower probabil-
ity on the central bank being a low-
inflation type). In this case, any rise in
inflation that might result from the
Fed’s loose monetary policy was more
likely to be attributed to a switch in the
central bank’s type. As a consequence,
the public would further revise down-
ward the probability that it attached to
the Fed being a low-inflation type of
central bank—the FOMC would have
lost credibility—and inflation expecta-
tions would have started to rise. 
Evidence regarding inflation expecta-
tions suggests that the Federal Reserve
has, in fact, maintained its credibility
since 2001.  Measures of inflation
expectations can be obtained directly
from surveys and indirectly from infla-
tion-indexed Treasury securities.
Although some measures have risen
during the past few months, they still
appear to be contained in the same
range of fluctuation that has prevailed
since 2001. A number of analysts have
suggested that the flat yield curve is
evidence of FOMC credibility: The
long end of the yield curve has not
risen because inflation expectations
have not changed. 
■ Summary 
Formally modeling credibility hopefully
provides some insight into why it takes
time for policymakers to lose or gain
credibility. When a central bank is trying
■ The Disinflation of 
the 1980s
Consider once more the situation in the
late 1970s. Inflation trended up through
the decade, with rises and falls associ-
ated with changes in energy prices. View
this history through the lens of Bayes’s
rule. By the end of the 1970s, the public
will have seen enough high inflation
rates to set close to zero the probability
that the Federal Reserve was a low-
inflation central bank. That is, given
enough time, the public eventually
makes the correct inference regarding
the central bank’s type. Observing sub-
sequent high inflation rates tended to
reinforce this “belief” that the Federal
Reserve was a high-inflation type, since
high inflation rates are more likely to be
seen under this type of central bank. In
other words, the Fed lacked credibility. 
Now, suppose that the Fed decided to
change its type, but was unable to
directly communicate this change of
intent to the public. We would not
expect to immediately see inflation fall
to the new long-run goal, say, 2 percent,
in part owing to the persistence built
into the inflation process, and in part
because the cost in terms of higher
unemployment would be unacceptably
high. However, over time we would
expect to see inflation rates that are
more likely to be delivered by a low-
inflation central bank than a high-infla-
tion central bank. 
The public faces a difficult inference
problem when it starts to see lower
inflation rates: Are the lower rates mere
happenstance or is the Fed now a low-
inflation central bank? In applying
Bayes’s rule, the public in essence takes
on board both possibilities. While it is
not likely that a high-inflation central
bank would generate, say, a 6 percent
inflation rate, changes in central bank
type are presumably rare events and the
public should not place too much
weight on such a transformation. Ini-
tially, the public places a greater weight
on chance, and so the probability that
the Fed is now a low-inflation central
bank will remain close to zero. Over
time, as more low inflation rates are
observed, the probability that the public
places on the Fed being a low-inflation
central bank rises. As this probability
rises, it will in fact rise more quickly
because the weight on a change in the
central bank’s type is rising while the
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to restore its credibility, the public ini-
tially infers that the low inflation is more
likely due to chance factors than to a
change in the central bank’s type, since
such changes are rare. It will take
months if not years of low inflation for
the central bank to regain or to lose its
credibility. This Economic Commentary
provides a coherent account of the disin-
flation of the 1980s, a time when the
Federal Reserve was rebuilding its 
credibility, and an explanation of why
inflation expectations have remained
contained after monetary policy became
more accommodative in 2001. 
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